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IN THE SUPRExME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Supreme Court No. 14223

vs.
EGBERT-HADERLIE HOG FARMS, INC.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
oooOooo

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
In this action defendant-appellant, Egbert-Haderlie
Hog Farms, Inc., seeks to recover for livestock and property
damage from plaintiff-respondent, Utah Cooperative Association,
on the theory that plaintiff-respondent breached an express
warranty of conformity and an implied warranty of merchantability
under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury on the theory of breach
of express and implied warranties and the Honorable G. Hal
Taylor directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff-respondent and
against defendant-appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the directed
verdict entered against it and a new trial.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant-appellant (hereinafter defendant) is
a close corporation which operated a hog farm near Spanish
Fork, Utah during 197 3.

The managing shareholders of that

corporation were Howard B. Egbert and Paul Haderlie.

The

plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter plaintiff) is a farmerfs
cooperative which both sells and processes livestock feed.
Defendant's hogs were purbread Durocs which were
kept in a pathogen free environment, (Tr* 192) and were more
susceptible to disease than ordinary hogs (Tr* 194). During
1973, defendant fed his hogs according to a dietary formula
developed by Standard Chemical of Omaha, Nebraska (Tr. 15-16).
That formula called for the mixture of one of Standard ChemicalTs
products, Mr. Meaty Base Mix, together with corn, barley, wheat,
soybean meal and some organic chemicals (Exhibit 60-P).

On

June 25, 1973, Mr. Haderlie arrived at plaintiff's Orem feed
mill with one hundred pounds of Mr. Meaty Base Mix which he had
purchased from Dalin Reese (Tr. 21). There Mr. Haderlie consulted with plaintiff concerning the cost of the additional
raw ingredients in the formula and instructed plaintiff to
write up a mixing order containing the exact formula he wanted
(Tr* 21). Mr. Haderlie further instructed plaintiff to mix
defendant's meat base mix with plaintiff's raw ingredients and
pelletize that mixture into a finished hog feed (Tr. 21).
Mr. Haderlie thought the pelletizing process was of significant
value to defendant's operation (Tr. 18). In all, there were
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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found no trace of salmonella in the six feed samples it
tested (Exhibits 83-D and 88-P); Intermountain Laboratories
discovered only moderate salmonella in one of the three feed
samples it tested (Exhibit 61-D); and, Mr. Haderlie testified
that he received a report from Omaha Testing Laboratories that
one of three feed samples had tested positively for salmonella
(Tr. 121).
Defendant suffered livestock damage resulting from
an outbreak of salmonella (Tr* 48) and filed this action* and
at trial, limited its claim to damages resulting from breach
of express and implied warranties under the UCC.
ARGUMENT
There are several grounds upon which the trial court's
directed verdict can and should be sustained.

It is axiomatic

that this court affirm the judgment below if the record on
appeal will allow.

Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Associa-

tion, 23 IK 2d 222, 461 P. 2d 290 (1969).

Even if grounds not

submitted on appeal constitute a basis for upholding the trial
court's judgment,"this court is obliged to affirm the judgment*
Peterson v. Fowler, 29 U.2d 366, 510 P.2d 523 (1973).
The defendant's burden on appeal is to convince this
court that the trial court committed reversible error in directing a verdict for the plaintiff.

That burden is not met if

there is any ground upon which this court can sustain the lower
court's directed verdict.

Knox v. Snow, 119 Utah 522, 229 P.2d
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874 (1951); Reid v. Anderson,
(1949).

116

Utah

455 , 211 P.2d 206

Because the resolution of that question is primarily

evidentiary, care has been taken to quote directly from the
trial transcript concerning each of defendant's failures of
proof.

And, although those failures grow with cumulative

weight, each failure alone is justification for the lower
court's refusal to submit the case to the jury.
Plaintiff submits that defendant's lack of evidence
on material issues supports the trial court's decision.

There

was a fatal lack of evidence on the following issues:
a.

Evidence that the transaction was a sale
of goods governed by the UCC to which
warranties attached;

b.

Evidence that there existed an express
warranty, that such warranty was breached,
and that the defendant sustained damage as
a result of that breach;

c.

Evidence that the goods sold to the defendant by the plaintiff were in some way
contaminated with salmonella; and

d.

Evidence that salmonella, even if it were
assumed to exist in plaintiff's goods,
was a breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The defendant recognizes its failure of proof and
has suggested on appeal that this court rely heavily on circumstantial evidence in the record and extract therefrom
inference upon inference in order to find some evidence which
would have supported a jury verdict.
The defendant tried this case solely on the theory
of warranty und€>r the Uniform Commercial Code, 70A Utah Code
Annotated §§ 2-313, 2-314.

Although defendant may have used

another legal theory or presented additional evidence, the
record demonstrates that defendant's case in chief failed to
present evidence from which a jury reasonably could have found
liability on defendant's theory of the case.

Under such cir-

cumstances, the court below was not only justified, but required
to direct a verdict*
To support its appeal, defendant relies on an express
warranty of conformity and an implied warranty of merchantability.

Plaintiff addresses the express warranty in Point I

and the implied warranty of merchantability in Point II. Although
defendant does not suggest on appeal the existence of an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, plaintiff, in
Point III, briefly discusses that implied warranty to contrast
it to the warranty of merchantability.
POINT I
NO EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT
THE PLAINTIFF BREACHED AN EXPRESS WARRANTY UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE WHICH CAUSED INJURY TO DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendant's only claim of the creation of an express
warranty is that the written mixing order of June 25, 1973,
(Exhibit 60-P) which contained mixing and pelletizing instructions, created an express warranty (Appellant's Brief pp 13, 16)
by virtue of §70-2-313(1) (b) of the Utah Code which provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created
as follows:
(b)

Any description of the goods which is
made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the affirmation
or promise.

Warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code, Title 70A of Utah
Code Annotated, then, arise only between sellers and buyers
relating to the sale of goods.

"Sale" is defined in the Uniform

Commercial Code as the ". . . passing of title from the seller
to the buyer for a price."

U.C.A. § 70A-2-106.

The written mixing order of June 25, 1973 (Exhibit 60-P)
contemplated a transaction in which plaintiff contracted to
perform the service of mixing and pelletizing the components
listed.

In conjunction with this transaction, plaintiff sold

some grains to defendant and defendant supplied a component
to plaintiff to be mixed and pelletized with the components
sold by plaintiff.
A warranty may extend only to so much of the transaction as relates to the sale of goods and does not apply to
transactions which are predominantly for services rather than

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a sale of goods.
781 (Colo. 1975).

St. Lukes Hospital v. Schmaltz, 5 34 P. 2d
To make the determination of the character

of the transaction, as defendant notes in its brief, courts
will look to the evidence in the record to ascertain whether
the primary objective of the transaction was the performance
of a service or the sale of goods.

If the primary objective

is the sale of goods, the implied warranties under the UCC
and that contained in § 70A-2-313(l)(b) of the Utah Code are
applicable.

If the primary objective is the rendering of

services, however, such warranties are inapplicable.

In the

instant case the record reveals no evidence that the transaction in question was primarily for the sale of goods, but
indicates instead that the transaction was primarily for the
rendering of services*

The only evidence in the record tends

to show the defendant's main objective was obtaining the
service of mixing and pelletizing.

The mixing order itself

reflects instructions to mix and pelletize certain grains with
a meat mix which was supplied by the defendant itself (Exhibit
60-P).

Mr. Haderlie repeatedly referred to the agreement

between the parties as a "mixing order" (Tr. 21, 22). Mr. Haderlie
further testified that the pelletizing was of singular importance to him (Tr. 17, 77). The only evidence in the record
tends to establish that the transaction in question was
primarily for the rendering of services and there is no evidence

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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from which the jury could reasonably have drawn the conclusion
that this transaction was primarily for the sale of goods and,
therefore, subject to the warranties imposed by the UCC and
§ 70A-2-313(l) (b).
Even if this failure of proof is overlooked and this
court determines that the transaction is predominantly one for
sale of goods elevating the mixing order to an express warranty
contemplated by U.C.A. § 70A-2-313, the defendant failed to
introduce evidence at trial to establish that the warranty had
been breached and that such a breach was linked to the outbreak
of salmonella which defendant alleges as the cause of its
damages.
If an express warranty were created by the written
mixing order, it related only to the component parts which
would be contained in each ton of mixed livestock feed, i.e.,
it would contain soybean meal, corn, barley, salt, S.P. 250
and organic iodine.

There was no express warranty of any kind

relating to the quality of the grains sold by plaintiff, only
the implied warranty of merchantability which arises when
merchants sell goods. No warranties, either express or implied,
could have been given by plaintiff to defendant concerning the
Mr. Meaty Base Mix since that portion of the livestock feed
was furnished to plaintiff. § 70A-2-106.

To hold that any warranty

extended to the Mr. Meaty Base Mix would be to make the plaintiff
an insuror of the quality of goods which were supplied to it
by the defendant itself.

In such circumstances the risk bearer

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The only evidence that the livestock feed did not
conform to the written mixing order, at the time it left the
control of the plaintiff and was delivered to defendant, was
the testimony of Mr. Haderlie that the feed was off color and
had a different smell which led him to believe that "screenings" had been blended into the feed (Tr. 40, 43). While
this testimony may have created a question as to whether the
delivered livestock feed contained "screenings" in addition to
the ingredients listed on the mixing order, defendant introduced not one iota of evidence in its case in chief which
would in any way link salmonella with these "grain screenings".
Likewise no evidence was introduced which linked salmonella
with the listed ingredients sold by plaintiff.

There was no

evidence upon which a jury could find a casual connection between
plaintiff's alleged breach and the salmonella contamination *
Even if this court were to assume that the alleged addition
of "screenings" raises a factual issue whether such screenings caused the contamination, such an assumption can be based
only on Haderlie1s own testimony regarding the color and smell
of the feed at the time of delivery (Tr. 40, 43). The court
would also necessarily have to conclude that as a matter of law,
Haderlie voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known and
appreciated danger.

Such knowledge, as defendant concedes

(Appellant's Brief pp 12-13), is an absolute defense in a breach
of warranty case. Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 488
P.2d 302 (1971).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Defendant, in its brief, cites Vernon v. Lake Motors,
26 U.2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971), as authority for the proposition that defendant had no evidentiary obligation to isolate
the specific ingredient which was the source of the contamination
(Appellant's Brief pp 23-24).

In Vernon, plaintiffs purchased

an automobile from defendants which was damaged when a fire
occurred under the dashboard and plaintiffs brought suit alleging breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code*

In

a case like Vernon, in which all the component parts of the
finished product had been sold and warranted by the seller, it
would be unduly burdensome to cause the buyer to pinpoint the
source of the difficulty.

However, in a transaction like the

one involved in the instant case, where a significant component
of the final product is supplied by the buyer himself, then the
buyer has a duty to come forward with some evidence demonstrating that the cause of the injury was in the component sold and
warranted by the party against whom the claim is asserted.
Plaintiff submits that the court's decision in Vernon would have
been different had the evidence shown that the Vernons had
ordered a new Ford automobile from Lake Motors but had brought
in their own set of resistors which they had bought from a
third party and requested that these resistors be placed in
the car's electrical circuitry in place of the Ford manufactured
resistors.

In such a situation, it is elementary that the buyer

would have the burden of adducing some evidence that the mal-
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functioning part which caused the damage was a part which had
been sold by the seller and not one which the buyer had himself
supplied.
Defendants contention that the trial court's directed
verdict was erroneous under the theory of express warranty is
without merit.. First, no evidence was adduced to show that
the written mixing order related to a transaction which was
predominately one for the sale of goods rather than for the
rendition of services.

Thus, there was no evidence that the

transaction was even subject to Uniform Commercial Code warranties.
Second, even if the livestock feed was the subject of an express
warranty under the UCC that it would conform to the mixing order,
there was no evidence even suggesting a casual connection between
alleged non-conformity in the composition of the mixed feed
and defendant's alleged damage attributable to salmonella.

Third,

if this court were to assume a casual connection between the
alleged non-conformity and salmonella contamination, it would
have to do so on the basis of defendant's own testimony which
would, in turn, necessarily establish, as a matter of law, a
knowing and voluntary assumption of risk.
POINT II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE DEFENDANT'S
ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PLAINTIFF BREACHED AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY.
The warranty of merchantability, unless otherwise
excluded, is implied in certain contracts for the sale of goods
in Utah by § 70A-2-314(1).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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This warranty is implied where:
(a)

There is a contract of sale of goods; and

(b)

The seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of the kind sought to be warranted.

Consequently, if goods are not "sold", as that term is defined
by § 70A-2-106, Utah Code, or the seller of the goods is not
a merchant dealing in that kind of goods, no vrarranty of merchantability is implied.

At trial, the defendant presented no

evidence upon which the jury could have reasonably determined
that the plaintiff breached this warranty with respect to any
goods sold the defendant.
A.
DEFENDANT INTRODUCED NO EVIDENCE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF SALMONELLA IN PLAINTIFF'S GOODS
1.

Defendant failed to adduce evidence of

contamination in plaintiff's goods.
The defendant failed to adduce any evidence upon
which the jury could have relied to find that salmonella
existed in plaintiff's grains at the time the feed was delivered
to the defendant.

The defendant seeks to excuse this failing

by attempting to burden the plaintiff with the responsibility
of vouchsafing the quality of the component supplied by defendant itself, the Mr. Meaty Mix.

Such a burden is not only

unsupported by the law but strains reason to its limits.
To avoid the failure of its evidence, the defendant
first argues that the arrangements between plaintiff and
defendant constituted a sale of only the finished product, a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

processed hog feed, and that the transaction cannot be broken
down into separate transactions.
undisputed facts in the record.

This argument ignores the
Mr. Haderlie clearly testified

of the separateness of the transactions and his interest in the
cost of plaintiff's grain.
Q.
(Mr.. Van Wagoner) Now let me be sure I
understand it. You bought the Mr. Meaty Mix from
someone named Dalin Reese; is that correct?
A.

(Mr. Haderlie) Yes.

Q.
And you then took the Mr. Meaty Mix
yourself to UCA when it was to be mixed; is that
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q*
And you purchased the grain that went
into the mix from UCA; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.
And then UCA took the Mr. Meaty that
you had purchased and combined it with the grain
that you purchased from them and mixed for you into
pellets?
A-

Yes.

(Tr. 76)

Q.
Did you enter into a contract then with
them for a certain amount of grain to be delivered
at certain points in time?
A.
To this extent, that we consulted with
them as to costs of raw ingredients and discussed
formulas with them. And then we would write up
a — they would write up a formula on this production order for us. (emphasis added)
Q.
Now, the raw ingredients are a specific
cost; is that right? There is a certain cost for
the grain?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A*

Yes.

Q.
And then there is a certain cost for
having it mixed up together with your Mr. Meaty?
A*

Yes.

Q.
So really you are paying three different
prices. You are paying for the Mr. Meaty. You
are paying for the grain and you are paying for
having it mixed together; is that correct?
A.

Yes.
(Tr. 77 )

The record lacks evidence to show that the contract
between plaintiff and defendant contemplated only the sale of
a processed hog feed.

Mr. Haderliefs testimony is unequivocal:

He bought grains from the plaintiff and then paid the plaintiff
to mix its grains with his own Mr. Meaty Mix. Mr. Haderlie
would not have questioned the plaintiff regarding the cost
of raw ingredients if the defendant was contracting to buy
only a finished product.

Additionally, plaintiff's invoices

(Exhibit 60-P) also reflect the breakdown of ingredients mentioned by Mr. Haderlie.

Finally, even in answer to his

counsel's own questions, Mr. Haderlie recognized the component
nature of the transaction.
Q.
Now the rest of the components, the
soybean, the grain, the corn, the barley, who
supplied that? (emphasis added)
A.

Gro-Best.

Q.
The Mr. Meaty Mix, where did you purchase
this from?
A.

We purchased it from Dalin Reese.
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The defendant has sought to avoid its burden of proof by arguing that the plaintiff should warrant what it did not own,
control, or sell*

The law implies this warranty of merchant-

ability only when goods are sold.

Section 70A-2-106 of the

Utah Code states that goods are sold when title passes for a
price.

Here there is no evidence that the plaintiff at any

time held title to the Mr. Meaty Mix or passed title to the
defendant for a price.

To adopt the defendant's statement of

the law would be to disregard the explicit language of the
Code and place a seller in the position of providing a supplier
with a warranty for products about which he has no knowledge,
over which he exercises no control, and from which he receives
no remuneration.

It is unreasonable to charge a seller with

such a burden; that burden must be borne by the supplying buyer.
And, if the resulting mixture of the products of the buyer
and seller is in someway defective, such a supplying buyer
must bear the burden of separating out that which the buyer
caused to be combined.

Any other resolution would place

sellers, acting in good faith to accommodate customersf at
the mercy of unprincipled, careless, or designing buyers who
choose to supply certain components of a finished product.

A

seller does not warrant that which he does not sell.
The defendant further attempts to justify its failure
of evidence by arguing that even if it supplied a component of
the feed, the whole transaction should be characterized by its
predominant feature which defendant argues is the purchase of
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a processed hog feed.

In effect, defendant argues that plaintiff

is the seller of defendant's own goods.

To support this unpre-

cedented argument, the defendant relies on cases which concern
the distinction between services and sales.

Certainly there

is precedent and reason to support courts' conclusions that
some transactions involving both the rendition of services and
the use of goods in connection with those services are in
essence a sale of goods and therefore those goods are subject
to UCC warranties.

But no court has been willing to charge a

seller with warranty responsibility for goods he did not sell
regardless of the nature of the transaction.

The rationale of

each of defendant's cited cases would be markedly altered if
any of the buyers had also supplied a component of the goods
purchased.

In the beauty salon cases, the nature of the proof

presented would differ if the buyers had supplied their own
shampoo and then developed a rash or lost hair.

In such a case,

the plaintiff would first need to establish that the transaction
was one predominantly for the sale of goods, and then come
forward with some evidence to show that the salon's rinse, hair
coloring, or similar product created the problem.

Obviously

such a plaintiff could not avoid her burden of proof by reciting that she was really only interested in the final result, a
permanent wave.

The same problem would face a patient who

required three pints of blood and supplied one pint of his own
from a third source.

In such cases, even if it were established
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that the transaction was primarily one for the sale of goods,
the plaintiff would be required to produce evidence upon
which a jury could conclude that the contamination was in
one of the two pints sold by the hospital.
The trial court's directed verdict can be sustained
on either of two additional grounds:
(a)

That there is no evidence in the record
upon which a jury could reasonably have
found that the transaction involved was
for the sale of goods, and consequently
no warranty of merchantability was implied
by law; or

(b)

Even if the transaction were predominantly
a sale of goods, there is no evidence in
he record from which the jury could reasonably have found that there was any salmonella
in plaintiff's sold and warranted goods f
hence the jury could only have speculated
in determining plaintiff 1 s liability«

2.
Defendant failed to adduce sufficient competent
circumstantial evidence of contamination in plaintiff's goods.
The defendant recognizes its failure of evidence and
seeks to characterize conjecture as circumstantial evidence from
which the jury might have drawn the defendant's desired inferences.

To sustain its position that its evidence is sufficient

to go to the jury the defendant cites the "more probable than
not" rule of
circumstantial evidence as advanced by Vernon v.
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Lake Motors, 26 U.2d 269, 488 P.2d 302 (1971).

That rule of

evidence allows a question to be submitted to a jury based on
circumstance alone if there is a rational basis for concluding
it was more probable than not that the plaintiffs goods were
the source of the defendant's injury.

Conger v. Pant & Russell/

Inc., 443 P.2d 201 (Or. 1968); Kaufman v. Fisher, 230 Or. 626,
371 P.2d 948 (1962).

However, if the evidence does not rise to

that probative quality it cannot go to the jury for the court
may not permit the jury to speculate upon the evidence, and a
finding of fact cannot be based upon surmise, conjecture, guess,
or speculation.

01sen v. Warwood, 123 Utah 111, 255 P.2d 775

(Utah 1953); Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P.2d 566
(Utah 1947).
Defendant presented no evidence of contamination in
plaintiff's goods at the time of delivery and the modicum of
circumstantial evidence in the record does not meet the test
of competency.

Defendant's own experts testified that it was

significantly more likely that any salmonella in the processed
feed would have come from defendant's meat base mix and not
from plaintifffs grain.
Dr. Derrick testified as follows:
Q. (Mr. Van Wagoner) And would you say, based
on your understanding of the salmonella organism
and where it appears, that it is more likely that
salmonella would be found in a meat substance than
in a grain substance?
A.
(Dr. Paul Derrick) Yes. I would imagine
that usually it — probably the origin in a case
like that would have been from a meat rather than
the grain.
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Q. Isn't it rather rare to find it in wheat
or other kinds of grains?
A. Yes. It would probably have to have
some sort of contamination like fecal contamination
or meat added to it that had the organism. (Tr. 144)

Dr. Hunter concurred with Dr. Derrick:
Q. (Mr. Van Wagoner) You mean its not likely
you are not more likely to find salmonella in meat
bases such as, oh, a fish or meat base than you are
in a grain?
A.

(Dr. John Hunter)

Q.

Significantly more probable, aren't you?

A.

Yes.

—

Oh, yes.

(Tr. 182-183)

This case differs markedly from Vernon v. Lake Motors,
supra.

In that case, there was no question that the defective

wiring was warranted.

The entire car was sold by the Ford

dealer, title to the wiring passed from Lake Motors to the
Vernons, and the Vernons supplied no constituent part of the
automobile.

When the Vernon's dashboard flared, it was reason-

able for a jury to have concluded from those circumstances that
the fire more likely than not originated in something sold with
the car.

There appears to have been no evidence that there

could have been any other source.

Although the exact source of

the fire eluded positive proof, the Vernons could, and did,
show that it originated under the dashboard, that there had
been previous difficulty with the car, including the windshield
wipers, and that the car had not been serviced by anyone else.
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The case at bar,

is much different.

Here it is as if the

Vernons had taken their car to a local Coalville mechanic who,
at their insistance, replaced a portion of the wiring, prior
to the fire.

In such a case, the Vernons would have an

obligation to present competent evidence to show it more likely
than not that something warranted by Ford was the cause of the
damage.

Under such circumstances a mechanic's opinion that the

fire started in the wiring could add nothing.
lack evidence of causation.

The jury would still

The plaintiff in the instant case

does not demand that this defendant specify v/hether the salmonella
was found in the soybean meal, the corn, the barley, the salt,
or the organic iodine, which were the component goods plaintiff
sold.

That would constitute an unnecessary burden.

This Court,

however, must require the defendant to adduce some evidence
that plaintiff's goods, as a group, were contaminated with
salmonella at the time of delivery.
Although each of Defendant's experts alluded to the
need for fecal contamination to introduce salmonella in grain,
the defendant presented no evidence to show that there was or
could have been fecal contamination in the plaintiff's grain
at the time of delivery.

Additionally, even if this Court were

to adopt the defendant's argument that the plaintiff sold only
a finished hog feed, including the meat base which defendant
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itself supplied, there is no competent evidence to show that the
finished feed much less, plaintiff's grains, contained salmonella
before it arrived at the defendant's farm.

Defendant's only

evidence is the admittedly unsupported speculation of defendant's
veterinarian which came into the record as a result of the
trial court's erroneous ruling of admissibility.

It was abun-

dantly evident from Dr. Hunter's testimony that he had no foundation
upon which to base a conclusion that the hog feed contained
salmonella at the time of delivery.

On cross examination Dr.

Hunter was unable even to begin to tell at what time the salmonella
was introduced into the feed.
Q. (Mr. Van Wagoner) Can you tell from what
you have seen from that report that came back from
Intermountain LabiF can you tell when that fecal
material got into that feed?
A.

(Dr. Hunter) No.

Q. You can't tell if it got into the feed
after the time it got to Mr. Haderlie's place?
A.

No.

Q. . . . And you canft tell from that report
whether it was contaminated in the grain or the meat
base mix, can you?
A.

Of course not.

Q. You can't even begin to tell at what time
the fecal contamination occurred, can you?
A.

No.
(Tr. 173-174)
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On redirect defendant's counsel tried to elicit a different
response regarding the same matter, for which there was now
obviously no foundation.
Q.
(Mr. Phil Patterson) And do you have an
opinion as to when that fecal contamination was
introduced into the feed, in light of the testing,
the evaluation and the other factors which you considered on the hog farm?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And what is that opinion.

At this point counsel for plaintiff objected because Dr. Hunter
had previously suggested that he had not the slightest av/areness
of the time at

which there had been such fecal contamination.

Mr. Van Wagoner: I object, Your Honor,
on the grounds that the question was asked by me
in cross-examination and the answer was that he
did not know.
Counsel for the defendant then suggested that plaintiff had
mischaracterized Dr. Hunter's testimony, and on that basis the
court admitted the evidence.
Mr. Phillip Patterson: I don't believe that's
correct, Your Honor. I will submit it without going
back into the record.
THE COURT:

He may answer.

Dr. Hunter: I think that it would have had to
have entered sometime prior to the arrival on the
Egbert-Haderlie Hog Farm.
(Tr. 193-194)
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It is clear from a reading of the record that at the time
Dr. Hunter rendered this opinion he possessed no facts or data
to support it.

Plaintiff's counsel labored with Dr. Hunter on

cross-examination to ascertain if there was some foundation
for such an opinion.

Then Dr. Hunter admitted that the report

from Intermountain Lab was of no aid, and further agreed that
he could not even "begin to tell" when salmonella entered the
feed.

Consequently, when Dr. Hunter began to testify "in light

of the testing,"

which told him nothing, and other similarly

vague factors, plaintiff's objection should have been sustained.
It is apparent that plaintiff's objection was overruled in
reliance on Mr. Patterson's representation that Dr. Hunter
had not testified that he had no knowledge of the facts or data
upon which such an opinion must be based.

The Court's ruling

was in error, and that testimony erroneously before the jury
should not now be considered.

Were the court correct in

admitting that testimony, there is insufficient probative value
in that witness' guess to submit the case to a jury.

Owings v.

Industrial Accident Commission, 31 Cal.2d 289, 192 P.2d 1 (1948).

j

y

••-••;••'••••

This Court may exclude erroneously admitted
evidence even though Plaintiff has not cross-appealed. 9
Moore, Federal Practice, \\ 204.11[3] at p. 933 (2d ed. 1975).
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Under the criteria of defendant's own authority, Hagenbuck v.
Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Suppl 676 (D.C.N.H. 1972), defendant's
case fails for want of competent evidence to show that the
finished feed, much less plaintiff's goods, contained salmonella
at the time of delivery.
B..

DEFENDANT INTRODUCED NO EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF'S GOODS
WERE UNMERCHANTABLE
Even if this court were to go so far as to hold that

there was sufficient evidence of contamination in the component
parts sold by plaintiff to warrant submission of defendant's
claim to the jury, this court should still sustain the trial
court's directed verdict on the grounds that there was a total
failure of proof that the warranty of merchantability was
breached.
The elements of merchantability are outlined in
§ 70A-2-314(2) of the Utah Code:
(2)

Goods to be merchantable must be at least
such as
(a)

pass without objection in the trade under
the contract description; and

(b)

in the case of fungible goods, are of
fair average quality within the description; and

(c)

are fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used; and

(d)

run, within the variations permitted by
the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among
all units involved; and
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(e)

are adequately contained, packaged, and
labeled as the agreement may require; and

(f)

conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.

A similar lack of evidence of unmerchantability
was recently before the Idaho Supreme Court, in Consolidated
Supply Company v. Babbit, 96 Idaho 636, 534, P.2d 466 (1975).
There, the court focused its attention on the merchantability
of a floor drain grating manufactured for use in swimming pools.
Although some allegations of defects in the drain were made, the
record disclosed no evidence that such defects caused the drain
to be unmerchantable.

In finding a lack of evidence of breach,

the court said, "where the dispute concerns an alleged breach
of implied warranty, the burden is on the buyer to prove that
the breach did in fact occur.

Goods to be merchantable, must

be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are to
be used.11

(emphasis added)

There, as here, where no evidence

is presented to show a material deviation from the ordinary,
the proponent has not met his burden of proof and cannot
recover.

The defendant cannot rest upon a showing that plaintiff's

goods may have been less than perfect, defendant's burden is to
present evidence that the goods were unmerchantable, as defined
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__2/
by the statute.
Even if the defendant had met its burden and presented
evidence to establish the presence of moderate salmonella in
plaintiff's goods, no evidence appears in the record to prove that
the presence of salmonella rendered the goods unmerchantable.
First, there is no evidence that the goods would not
have passed without objection in the trade.

The only evidence

in the record was that Mr. Haderlie subscribed to higher
standards than other hog farmers in the area and would have
refused feed that the others would have accepted.
Q. (Mr. Van Wagoner) Mr. Haderlie, I
gathered from the testimony yesterday that you
take your hog farming seriously?
A.

Yes.

Q. And that you have higher standards
than other hog farmers in the area?
A.

Yes.

Q. And is that possible that you would refuse
feed that other hog farmers might take?
A.

It's possible.

Q.

In fact it may be very likely, isn't it?

A.

Yes.

(Tr. 109-110)

_2/
Similarly, in Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc.,
198 N.E.2d 309 (Mass. 1964), a purchaser of fish chowder brouglrt
an action to recover for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability because the chowder contained some fish bones. There,
the court held that there was no evidence to show that the presence
of fish bones rendered the chowder unmerchantable and dismissed
the buyer's action.
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That evidence and all its reasonable inferences certainly do not
tend to show that plaintiff!s goods were objectionable in the
trade.
Secondly, there is a complete absence of testimony
that these goods were not of fair average quality.

Additionally,

no evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the
goods were not fit for the ordinary purposes for which the goods
are used, to wit, to feed ordinary hogs. The sole testimony in
this regard is offered by defendant's veterinarian, Dr. Hunter.
Testifying in response to a question from plaintiff's counsel
on cross-examination, Dr. Hunter gave his opinion of the significance of feeding the allegedly defective grain to other hogs
without incident.
A. O.K. There are at least two possibilities,
as I see them. One is, I think you answered your
own question, the lack of reported outbreak of
salmonella alone. And it is highly possible that
the other hog farmers did not report any salmonella.
I mean report any diarrhea. The other possibility,
and the one I personally feel more feasible, and
that is that Egbert-Haderlie!s Hog Farm, it borders
on an S.P.F., Specific Pathogen Free hog farm,
which means that every measure is taken that is
possible to take to avoid any contamination, outside
contaminants, avoid any possibility of people
visiting, and possibility of any contaminants.
Most other hog farms, at least in Utah County,
are not of this nature. And therefore the contaminant,
or the salmonella that was in the feed when taken to
other hog farms, the other hogs could be more host
specific and they could be more — have a higher
resistance to the salmonella than did Mr. Haderlie's
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hogs. And therefore wouldn't show any diarrhea.
It depends on the population, the amount of immunity
in the population. An example I often use is when
you catch cold, how come everybody doesn't catch a
cold. Only maybe certain members of each family
will. And it just depends on the host susceptibility.
And on a farm like this, a closed situation
like this, the individuals are highly susceptible
whereas in another instance the susceptibility and
the immunity may be very, very high and you won't
get any diarrhea.
(Tr. 192-193)
Dr. Hunter further described defendant's hogs on cross-examination.
Q.
(Mr. Van Wagoner)
among hogs?

Is this a common thing

A. Common thing among any living organism,
among most hogs it's common. Then you could have
some minor amounts of salmonella and it wouldn't
show up, wouldn't harm them at all. Yes, this
could be possible.
Q. Mr. Haderlie's hogs are really sort of
unique, then, aren't they?
A. They are. Well, I wouldn't call it unique.
He just tries to run a clean operation.
Q. But in the sense they may be more susceptible
to disease than ordinary hogs, they are unique?
A.

In that respect, yes.
(Tr. 194)

Not only is there a complete lack of evidence that the plaintiff's
goods were not fit for ordinary purposes, the only evidence in
the record demonstrates that moderate amounts of salmonella are
common and would not have harmed ordinary hogs.

Moreover, there

is clear evidence that the defendant's pigs were more susceptible
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to moderate salmonella than ordinary hogs but not a scintilla
of evidence that plaintiff's goods were unfit for ordinary hogs*
Consequently, defendant's evidence reflects only upon an extraordinary use of the feed and is not probative of the feed's
fitness "for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used."

Utah Code § 70-2-314 (a) (c)*
Finally, defendant advanced no evidence to suggest

that the goods did not run of even kind, quality and quantity;
or that the goods were not adequately contained, packaged and
labeled; or that there were promises or affirmations of fact
on any container or label to- which the goods did not conform.
In fact, there was nothing to present to the jury.
There was no evidence that the much-discussed, moderate amount
of salmonella detected by Dr. Derrick (Tr. 137) originated
in plaintiff's goods.

And even if such evidence had been adduced

there was no evidence that such feed was unfit for ordinary
hogs and thus, unmerchantable•
cannot recover.

Absent such evidence, defendant

Defendant has adduced no evidence that

plaintiff's grains were unmerchantable•

Moreover, the defendant

brought forth no evidence that the entire mixture, including the
defendant's own component, was unmerchantable.

Those were

fatal failings from which defendant's case cannot recover.
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Defendant's contention of breach of implied warranty of merchantability is without merit.

First, defendant presented no evidence

that the transaction was predominantly for the sale of goods.
Secondly, even were the transaction characterized as a sale of
goods, defendant advanced no evidence that salmonella was in
plaintiff's goods at any time prior to delivery.

Finally, even

if defendant had adduced evidence sufficient to show the existence
of moderate salmonella in plaintiff's goods, the record discloses
no evidence that such salmonella made the coeds unmerchantable.
POINT III
THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE
EXISTENCE OF AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE
In some commercial transactions where, as here, a
party has special needs, those needs are communicated to a
seller, and the seller is aware of a prospective buyer's reliance
on the seller's expertise, the Code implies an additional
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has
reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying
on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded
or modified under the next section an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose. §70A-2-315, U.C.A.
As the Code directs this warranty is to be implied only where
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(a)

At the time of contracting;

(b)

The seller has reason to know that the goods he
sells are required for a particular purpose; and

(c)

The seller has reason to know that the buyer is
relying on the seller's judgment to select or
furnish goods suitable for that purpose.

Although the defendant does not advance this warranty on appeal,
a brief analysis of the warranty will highlight the defendant's
unique position in that (1) the defendant supplied part of the
mixture, (2) specified the mixture formula, and (3) had special
pigs.
A contract of sale under the Code may include both
a warranty of merchantability and a warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, but they are distinct warranties, the former
a warranty of average quality for ordinary purposes, the latter
a warranty of specific quality for particular purposes.

In the

instant case the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose appear
well suited for defendant's circumstances.

Defendant owns uniquely

susceptible hogs which may become violently ill by contact with
ordinary pathogens.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that even had

defendant advanced this theory.on appeal it would not prevail.
Principally, there is no evidence in the record to
show that the plaintiff was aware of the extraordinary sensitivity
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of defendant's hogs.

That alone would bar submission of this

case to the jury on that theory.

Moreover, there is no evidence

that defendant relied on the plaintiff in any way.

The record

is clear that defendant obtained a standard formula from Standard
Chemical Company and submitted it to plaintiff.
Q. (Mr. Patterson) O.K. Let's do it that way.
During calendar year 1973, and prior to July 1973,
was there a particular type of feed that you were
utilizing?
A. (Mr. Haderlie) Yes. We had formulas set
up for us, worked with the feed company and had
balanced formulas.
Q. Now, the formulas, you said you had them
set up for you. Was someone else working with you
in establishing what sort of dietary basis these
formulas would be?
A.

Yes. Standard Chemical.

Q.

And where are these people located?

A.

Omaha, Nebraska.
•\

f

Q. And then what s the . . . Then once this
standard formula was worked out, then what happened?
What did you do with it?
A. We took the formula to Bunker Feed, or GroBest, what they was known as at that time, and we
sat down with them and we presented the formula to
them and asked them to price it for us and make
this particular feed for us.
(Tr. 15-16)
The comments to the Uniform Commerical Code are explicit that no
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises under such
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circumstances.

Official Comment 2, to §2-315 explains that a

warranty of fitness for a particular purpose does not arise
when a buyer takes upon himself the responsibility of furnishing
technical specifications.

Similarly Comment 9, to §2-316 explains

The situation in which the buyer gives
precise and complete specifications to the
seller is not explicitly covered in this
section, but this is a frequent circumstance
by which the implied warranties may be excluded.
The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
would not normally arise since in such a
situation there is usually no reliance on the
seller by the buyer . . .
Thus without specific evidence of reliance this warranty would
not arise, and it would not be error to refuse to submit the case
to a jury.

Without sufficient evidence to establish both the

plaintiff's knowledge of the defendants peculiar needs and the
defendant's reliance on the plaintiff's skill, the law '
implies no warranty for a particular purpose.

Aluminum Company of

America v. Electro Flo Corp,, 451 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1971);
Wasatch Chemical Co. v. Leon, 123 U.2d 296, 259 P.2d 301 (1953).
In this case there was no evidence from which the jury could
reasonably have found the existence of such a warranty.

The trial

court was correct in directing a verdict against the defendant's
allegations of breach of this implied warranty*
CONCLUSION
The record in this case, offers several grounds,
any one of which is sufficient to sustain the direction of
the verdict against defendant.

First, no evidence was pre-
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sented which could in any way demonstrate that the transaction
was primarily for the sale of goods rather than the rendition *•
of services and, therefore, no warranties either express or
implied could arise under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.
Even if this initial insufficiency in defendant's
case is overlooked and a sale of goods giving rise to warranties
under the Uniform Commercial Code is assumed, defendant introduced no evidence to establish either a breach of an express
warranty of conformity or an implied warranty of merchantability.
There was no evidence of breach of an express warranty
of conformity to the mixing order causing damage to defendant.
That warranty, if assumed, goes only to the components to be
mixed and the only possible evidence of breach is the testimony
of Mr. Haderlie that the feed was "off color".

This evidence

was in no way tied to salmonella or defendant's damages.

Even

assuming that "off color" appearance implied salmonella, defendant would be barred because he himself noted the color and
then fed his hogs with it, thus assuming the risk as a matter
of law.
There was no evidence of breach of an implied warranty
of merchantability, assuming one arose, since defendant introduced no evidence that any of the grains plaintiff sold contained
salmonella at the time of delivery.

Plaintiff did not warrant

the Mr. Meaty Base Mix which defendant itself supplied since one
cannot warrant what it does not sell.

Even were the court

to assume that plaintifffs grain contained salmonella at the
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time of delivery, there was no evidence that the feed was not
merchantable.

The only evidence in the record is that the

feed would not have harmed ordinary hogs and would have passed
without objection in the trade.

The record shows that defen-

dant's hogs were special hogs which were extremely susceptible
to pathogens*

Under the Uniform Commercial Code, an implied

warranty of merchantability is breached only if the goods are
unfit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used
and that they would not pass without objection in the trade.
The trial court's direction of the verdict against
defendant is amply supported by the record and should be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of February, 1976.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS to Philip C. Patterson, Attorney for
Defendant Egbert-Haderlie Hog Farms, Inc., 427~27th Street,
Ogden, Utah 84401, this 20th day of February, 1976.
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